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THE USE OF ARBITRATION TO SETTLE
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Carla S. Copeland
INTRODUCTION

Ever since Great Britain and a recently independent United States
agreed to submit a border dispute to arbitration in 1794, in accordance
with the Jay Treaty,' international arbitration has proved a useful
method of settling limited territorial disputes between nations. 2 One
of the most attractive features of arbitration is that the proceedings
are generally conducted in ad hoc courts of arbitration specifically
designed to deal with a particular dispute.3 The parties can participate
in defining the issue to be adjudicated, and they have the power to
select the arbitrators, the forum, and the rules of procedure that will
be used to settle the dispute.4 Arbitration also provides the parties
with the option of holding hearings in secret. 5 Thus, arbitration provides an appealing forum for nations that have decided to resolve
their differences through peaceful means because it is much more flexible than a permanent court and allows the parties to maintain more
control over the proceedings.'
Arbitration has been used in the past, with much success, to settle
limited issues of territorial sovereignty.' The question remains, however, as to whether it is an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism
to settle ethnic-based claims to land. The proliferation of ethnic-based
1. The official name of the Jay Treaty is the General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. See Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law
354 (2d ed. 1995) (excerpting J. Simpson & H. Fox, International Arbitration: Law
and Practice 1-40 (1959)). It is commonly called the Jay Treaty after John Jay, the

American Secretary of State. See id. The Treaty resolved various outstanding questions between the United States and the United Kingdom that had arisen after the
United States declared independence. See id. at 354-55. Those issues not resolved by
the parties were referred to arbitration. See id. at 355. Under Article 5 of the Treaty,

arbitration was used to determine part of the boundary between the remaining British
possessions and the United States. See id. The Jay Treaty is considered to have re-

vived the use of public international arbitration. See id. at 354.

2. See, eg., Henry T. King, Jr. & James D. Graham, Origins of Modern International Arbitration,51 Disp. Resol. J., Jan.-Mar. 1996, at 42, 42 (discussing the history

of modem arbitration).
3. See Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International
Law, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 65, 70 (1997) (stating the reasons why states want to
preserve the flexibility permitted by arbitration).

4. See id
5. See id.
6. See Richard B. Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of International Adjudication, 1 J. Int'l Disp. Resol. 131, 163-64 (1987) (listing the possible advantages and disadvantages of dispute resolution by a permanent court).

7. See Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes 168, 168 (Evan Luard ed., 1970) (stating that the use of arbitration to settle

territorial disputes has been most successful in settling limited territorial issues).
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violence in the context of the secession and breakup of states currently poses one of the greatest threats to public order and human
rights.8 But these conflicts are not only about ethnic groups seeking
self-determination through political independence and statehood; they
are fundamentally issues about control over land.9 Thus, constructing
effective means to peacefully resolve territorial disputes is a matter of
profound importance.
This Note addresses this issue by examining three separate arbitral
proceedings that have each involved a territorial dispute between parties with a history of violent ethnic or religious conflict. Part I provides a brief overview of the arbitral process. Part II examines two
arbitrations that have been successful in resolving territorial disputes,
the Rann of Kutch Arbitration between Pakistan and India, and the
Taba Area Arbitration between Israel and Egypt. In an effort to illustrate the types of disputes most appropriate for resolution through
arbitration, this part discusses the issues decided, the arguments made,
and the evidence presented in each arbitration. Part III examines the
arbitration between the two Bosnian Entities over the Brcko area, as
provided for by the Dayton Accords. This part shows that the use of
arbitration to solve territorial disputes can be successful only where
the parties are committed to resolving the dispute peacefully through
arbitration, and that such a commitment is unlikely if the dispute involves an issue considered to be of vital national importance. For arbitration to successfully resolve such disputes, the parties must have a
modicum of trust in each other and be willing to accept the fact that
they may lose. Thus, an arbitration agreement imposed upon the parties by the international community will not work. Part IV considers
the appropriateness of other dispute resolution mechanisms that may
be used to resolve territorial disputes. This Note concludes that any
attempt by the international community to force states to arbitrate
such disputes may discourage future parties from using the procedure.
I.

ARBITRATION GENERALLY

Arbitration is often compared to the use of judicial settlement.' 0
Both are legal means of settling disputes, and both presuppose an obligation of the parties to accept the award (in the case of arbitration)
8. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders
of New States, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 590, 590 (1996) (examining whether the doctrine of
uti possidetis is appropriate for contemporary challenges related to state unity).
Uti possidetis is a doctrine providing that a state emerging from decolonization shall
inherit the colonial administrative borders that it held at the time of independence.

See id.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., D.H.N. Johnson, InternationalArbitrationBack in Favour?, 1980 Y.B.

World Aff. 305, 327-28 (explaining that the political climate between states affects the
frequency with which arbitration is used as a means of settling international disputes).
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or judgment (in the case of judicial settlement)." In addition, the
12
award or judgment is usually based on rules of international law.
The most significant difference between arbitration and judicial settlement is the method used to establish the tribunal. While judicial settlement involves the reference of a dispute to a permanent court

whose composition is primarily4 fixed,' 3 in arbitration the parties to the
dispute select the arbitrators.'

When formulating an arbitration proceeding, the parties to the dispute usually define the composition of the tribunal through either an
ad hoc agreement (compromis) or by reference to a prior agreement
between the parties in which they had agreed to submit future disputes to arbitration.'" The composition of a tribunal can vary greatly,
depending on the parties' wishes. The most common form of arbitral
tribunal presently used is a three or five member panel, with each
party appointing an equal number of members. 6 The final member of
the tribunal is a neutral third party.' 7 This type of tribunal usually

decides disputes by majority vote. 8 The appointment of the members
of the arbitral tribunal is often contentious, 9 particularly the selection
of the neutral arbitrator, because it is the decision of this neutral arbitrator that often determines the arbitration's outcome. 20 Thus, arbitration agreements often provide that if the parties cannot agree upon

11. See id. at 306.
12. Article 38 (2) of the statute of the International Court of Justice permits the
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree. In the case of arbitration,
the parties to the dispute have the power to instruct the Tribunal on what basis it
should render its decision. See id- at 306 n.9.
13. See id at 306-07; J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement 121 (3d ed.
1998); Louis B. Sohn, The Future of Dispute Settlement, in The Structure and Process
of International Law 1121, 1125 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds.,
1986).
14. See Louis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 788 (3d ed.
1993); Johnson, supra note 10, at 306-07; Merrills, supra note 13, at 92; Sohn, supra
note 13, at 1125.
15. See Henkin et al., supra note 14, at 788; Merrills, supra note 13, at 88.
16. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 91. This form of tribunal was first used in the
Alabama Claims case (1871-2), which involved Great Britain's responsibilities as a
neutral during the American Civil War. See id. Among the other forms of arbitration
that have been used historically are sovereign arbitration where the dispute is referred to a single person, usually a head of state. See id. at 89. During medieval times,
the Pope was often called upon to act as arbitrator. See id. Other variations include
convening a tribunal composed of an equal number of national arbitrators and one
neutral member who decides the dispute if the national members cannot agree (the
origins of this form of arbitration can be traced back to the Treaty of Ghent (1814)) or
selecting only national arbitrators (this method was employed in Jay Treaty (1794)).
See id. at 88-89.
17. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 92.
18. See Sohn, supra note 13, at 1126-27.
19. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 92-93.
20. See id
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the neutral arbitrator, the President of the International Court or another disinterested party shall make the selection."'
In addition to establishing the form of the tribunal, the compromis
or treaty that refers the dispute to arbitration should include the applicable rules of procedure.2" Among these procedural arrangements
are the location of the proceedings, how they are to be paid for, the
time limit within which the award shall be rendered, the number and
order of the pleadings, how the tribunal will obtain evidence, and the
majority required for the award.23 Each procedural arrangement can
be negotiated separately, or the parties may elect to adopt standard
procedural provisions such as those followed by the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J."). 24 Any procedural matter not provided for
in the compromis must be determined by the tribunal, which "has the
inherent power to determine
its procedures in a way not inconsistent
' '25
with the compromis.
The compromis also incorporates the issues to be decided by the
tribunal.2 6 The parties may define the issues broadly, but more often
the questions presented to the tribunal are narrowly defined.2 7 Because the tribunal is limited in its function, it must only address the
controversy before it and may not delve into any deeper issues that
may exist between the parties.2 8 The definition of the issue is important because it determines the scope of the tribunal's authority;2 9 thus,
it is almost always a matter for negotiation by the parties. ° If the
tribunal exceeds its authority by answering questions not presented to
it, the parties may challenge the award as a nullity.3 ' The doctrine of
nullification is a problem unique to arbitration.32 Although it is similar in effect to the problem of enforcement, common to all international awards or judgments, nullification asserts that there is not even
a valid award to enforce.33 Having outlined the basic formulation of
arbitration, part II examines two successful arbitrations.
21. See id. at 93.
22. See id. at 95.
23. See id. (providing a more detailed list of procedural arrangements that are
normally included in the compromis); see also Henkin, supra note 14, at 790-91 (quoting Article 2 of the International Law Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure).
24. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 95 (using the Maritime Delimitation case as an
example of parties adopting the I.C.J.'s rules of procedure).
25. Henkin, supra note 14, at 791.
26. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 97.
27. See id. at 96.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 97.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 98; Johnson, supra note 10, at 310.
32. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 310.
33. See id.
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SUCCESSFUL ARBITRATIONS

This part looks at the successful application of international arbitration to two divisive conflicts: the Rann of Kutch and the Taba Area
disputes. This part demonstrates that arbitration can be effective
when invoked in well-defined, fact-oriented territorial disputes.
A.

The Rann of Kutch Arbitration

The dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch
("The Rann") has been heralded as "one of the major instances of
international arbitration in the post-war period."'
The object of the
arbitral tribunal was to determine a sector of the boundary between
the territory that, in British times, was known as Sind (now part of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan) and the State of Kutch and other Native
Indian States (now part of the Province of Gujarat in the Republic of
India).3 5 The Rann (or marsh) of Kutch spans approximately 200
miles across the southern portion of the Indo-West Pakistan border. 6
It has been described as a "desolate wasteland ' 37 because it is practically uninhabited and has little economic or strategic value.3 8
1. Background
The territorial dispute had century-old origins, but it became acute
shortly after India and Pakistan emerged as independent states in
1947. 39 India claimed the Rann as part of its territory, while Pakistan
insisted that the boundary ran through the "middle of the Rann or
approximately along the 24th parallel."' Early in 1965, India, claiming that Pakistan illegally patrolled the Rann north of the 24th parallel, posted border guards along the line.4 ' Pakistani troops fired upon
and cleared India's outposts in April.42 Hostilities increased and during the next several weeks Pakistani and Indian forces engaged in battles involving several thousand troops. 43 Shortly after the fighting
began, Britain began negotiations, and soon afterwards, in an agreement dated June 30, 1965, both parties agreed to a cease fire and to
submit the dispute to settlement by arbitration."
34. J. Gillis Wetter, The Rann of Kutcz Arbitration, 65 Am. J. Int'l L 346, 346
(1971).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id.
See Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India 374 (2d ed. 1982).
See id.
See William J. Bamds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers 197 (1972).
See Wetter, supra note 34, at 346.
Barnds, supra note 38, at 197.
See Wolpert, supra note 36, at 374.
See id.
See id. at 375.
44. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 346. By August of that year, the center of conflict
and confrontation had shifted north to Kashmir and the Punjab. See Wolpert, supra
note 36, at 374.
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In accordance with the agreement, Pakistan and India each nominated a non-national as member of the tribunal, and the Secretary
General of the United Nations appointed the Tribunal's Chairman. 45
Prior to the commencement of oral hearings, and in accordance with
the rules of the Tribunal pertaining to discovery, a delegation from
Pakistan visited New Delhi to inspect and obtain copies of maps and
documents in Indian Government archives.46 A delegation from India
visited Islamabad for the same purpose.4 7 The terms of the cease-fire

agreement provided that the parties would undertake "to implement
the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible,"48 and the
parties agreed that the Tribunal should remain intact until its findings
had been implemented.49
2. Issues and Arguments
The first issue to be decided by the Tribunal was "whether the
boundary in dispute [was] a historically recognised and well-established boundary."50 The Tribunal examined voluminous documentary
evidence, including British maps and surveys dating largely from the
period between 1870 and 1947. 5' The Tribunal concluded that "there
did not exist ...a historically
recognised and well-established bound'

ary in the disputed region. 52
The second main issue was whether Great Britain should be held,
by its conduct, to have recognized, accepted, or acquiesced in the
claim of the former State of Kutch (now part of India) that the Rann
was Kutch territory.53 Such a determination would preclude Pakistan,
as successor of Sind and thus of the territorial sovereign rights of
Great Britain in the region, from successfully claiming any part of the
disputed territory. 4 The Tribunal relied primarily on maps published
by the British Government in India of a conterminous boundary
roughly coinciding with India's claim. This boundary had become a
constant feature on all maps produced as surveys of India after 1907.56
45. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 346.
46. See id. at 347.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 348.
49. See id. After the Tribunal rendered its award, the parties jointly demarcated
the boundary, and the Tribunal was dissolved on September 22, 1969. The entire process, from the cease-fire to the implementation of the award took a little more than

four years. See id.
50. Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.) (The Indo-Pak. Western Boundary
Case Trib. 1968), excerpts reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 667 (1968) [hereinafter Rann of
Kutch Award].
51. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 350.
52. Rann of Kutch Award, supra note 50, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 672 (1968).
53. See id., reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 672 (1968).
54. See id., reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 672 (1968).
55. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 351.
56. See id. at 354.
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India also offered into evidence the fact that assertions of the Rao
(Ruler) of Kutch that the Rann was his territory had not been contradicted by the British authorities for approximately seventy-five years
prior to independence. 7 Further, India presented reports in which
both the Rao and the British had stated that the Rann was Kutch territory. 8 The Tribunal concluded that these three grounds of India's
case were all acts of relinquishment by the British, and that they had
the effect of leaving "the disputed territory, or the greater part
thereof, in the hands of the sovereign or sovereigns
who by reason of
''59
geographical proximity were there to receive it.
The Tribunal then looked at further evidence of British acquiescence. Specifically, the Tribunal sought to determine
whether the British Administration in Sind ... performed acts.., in

assertion of rights of territorial sovereignty over the disputed tract
which were of such a character as to be sufficient in law to confer
title ... upon Sind, and thereby upon its successor, Pakistan, or,

conversely, whether such exercise of sovereignty on the part of
Kutch and the other States abutting upon the Great Rann, to whose
rights India is successor, would instead operate to confer title on
India ....
60

The Tribunal noted that evidence relating to acts of sovereign rights
over the territory must be evaluated with the nature of the territory in
mind.6 ' Two facts were crucial in the understanding of what would
constitute sovereign functions in this situation: (1) much of the territory in dispute was uninhabitable; and (2) the two entities were agricultural societies at the time relevant to the proceedings.6' Thus, the
activities and functions of government were limited to the imposition
of customs duties and taxes on land, livestock and agricultural produce, and to the maintenance of peace and order.' The Tribunal
found that the activities of neither Kutch nor Sind authorities within
the majority of the Rann were sufficient to constitute continuous and
effective exercise of sovereign authority. 6 The Tribunal concluded,
however, that Sind did exercise sovereign control over certain portions of the territory known as Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet, areas
that are raised above the level of the Rann and were used by Sind
inhabitants as grazing pastures.65
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See id.
See id.
Rann of Kutch Award, supra note 50, reprintedin 7 LLM.633,672,685 (1968).
IL, reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 667 (1968).
See id., reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 674-75 (1968).
See id, reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 674-76, 681 (1968).
See id., reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 674-76, 681 (1968).
See id, reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 676 (1968).
See id., reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 676-78 (1968).
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Based on Sind's acts of sovereignty over Dhara Banni and Chhad
Bet, the Tribunal awarded these areas to Sind's successor, Pakistan.66
The Tribunal also awarded a peninsula of land, known as Nagar
Parkar, to Pakistan, even though Pakistan had not established legal
title to it.6 7 The Tribunal based this decision on the fact that the area
was wholly surrounded by Pakistani territory.68 Thus, the Tribunal
reasoned that awarding the area to India would inevitably lead to fric-

tion and conflict.6 9 With regard to the remainder of the territory, the

Tribunal concluded that the evidence of Sind sovereignty over the majority of the Rann was insufficient to establish sovereignty.7" The Tribunal thus relied primarily on the evidence produced by India of
British relinquishment of rights over the Rann, and awarded the remainder of the territory, approximately ninety percent of the Rann, to
India.7
3. Preliminary Analysis
The Rann of Kutch Arbitration was extremely successful in resolving a territorial dispute between two nations with a history of conflict.72 Throughout the proceedings, the parties cooperated with each
other and with the Tribunal. Neither side questioned the authority of
the Tribunal, and both sides worked together to implement the decision.7 3 This success can be attributed to several factors. First, the issues before the Tribunal were well-defined. Additionally, the parties
had previously agreed that the boundary was conterminous between
the two nations and that, therefore, the territory in dispute had to
belong to one or the other, which further limited the scope of Tribunal's authority.74 Second, as the Tribunal noted, the dispute was essentially factual in nature. The parties did not focus their arguments
on complex legal issues, but relied instead on testimony and documentary evidence.7 6 The Tribunal, in turn, relied on the weight of this
evidence and the relative strength of the parties' arguments in rendering its decision. Other than incidentally, the Tribunal did not have to
enunciate or expound potentially contentious principles of international law.7 7
66. See id., reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 689-90 (1968).
67. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 355.
68. See Rann of Kutch Award, supra note 50, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 692 (1968).
69. See id., reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 692 (1968).
70. See Fox, supra note 7, at 192.
71. See id.
72. See Wetter, supra note 34, at 357.
73. See id. at 356 (discussing the parties' contributions to the preparation of the
Award).
74. See Rann of Kutch Award, supra note 50, reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 633, 666 (1968).
75. See id. reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 671 (1968).
76. See generally Wetter, supra note 34 (explaining that the types of evidence relied on by the parties included primarily maps and documents).
77. See id. at 349.
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More important to the success of the arbitration was that the dispute over the Rann did not represent a major political dispute between the two countries.7 8 The Rann had little economic or strategic

value and was sparsely populated.7 9 Thus, although large-scale fighting preceded the arbitration proceedings, the dispute was more symbolic than substantive.80 Furthermore, shortly after the cease fire,
both nations had shifted their attention to disputes over Kashmir and
Punjab, areas more vital to the interests of both countries.8 "
B.

The Taba Area Arbitration

The successful arbitration of the dispute over the Taba area between Egypt and Israel "represent[ed] a significant milestone in the
development of relations between the two formerly warring nations."' 8 The objective of the arbitral tribunal was restricted to deciding the location of fourteen boundary pillars of "the recognized
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine,"' thus deciding the status of the Taba area, a strip
of land in the Sinai on the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba.
1. Background
The origins of the dispute can be traced to 1906, when Turkish
forces occupied the coastal settlement of Taba but were forced to
withdraw under British pressure. s4 After negotiations between Anglo-Egyptian and Turkish representatives, a territorial agreement was
reached85 ("the 1906 Agreement") and the border between Egypt and
the Ottoman Empire was fixed as running through Taba. In 1915,
however, a British military survey produced a map that showed the
border as running along a line approximately three-quarters of a mile
to the north-east of the 1906 line.?7 The 1915 line became the boundary with Egypt under the British Palestine Mandate and remained as
78. See Fox, supra note 7, at 191-92.
79. See id. at 191.
80. See id at 192.
81. See Wolpert, supra note 36, at 374.
82. Haihua Ding & Eric S. Koenig, Treaties-Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and
Israel-Demarcationof InternationallyRecognized Boundaries-Arbitrationof Disputes-Taba, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 590, 594 (1989).
83. Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area (Egypt v. Isr.) para. 15

(Egypt-Isr. Arb. Trib. 1988) [hereinafter Award in Taba Arbitration], reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1433 (1988).
84. See id para. 32, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1438 (1988).
85. See id. paras. 33-51, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1438-43 (1988) (discussing in
depth the delimitation and demarcation of the 1906 line).
86. See Martin Wright, Egypt-Israel (Taba Strip), in Border and Territorial Disputes 232 (Alan J. Day ed., 2d ed. 1987). "At this time, Egypt was occupied by Great
Britain, while remaining a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire." Ding & Koenig,
supra note 82, at 592 n.10.
87. See Wright, supra note 86, at 232.

3082

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

such when Israel proclaimed itself an independent state in May 1948.88
In the June 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Israel captured the
Sinai peninsula from Egypt, bringing the Taba area under Israeli
control.89
In the March 1979 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, Israel
agreed to withdraw its troops from the Sinai and to recognize "the full
exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized
border between Egypt and mandated Palestine." 9° Pursuant to the
Treaty of Peace, a joint commission was formed to demarcate the
boundary. 91 When survey teams reached the Taba area, the parties
could only agree on the placement of three boundary pillars.' Despite negotiations, the parties failed to agree on the placement of the
remaining pillars. 93 Thus, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to
arbitration, in accordance with the 1979 Treaty. 94
The Tribunal consisted of five members, one national of each state
nominated by the respective parties and three non-nationals acceptable to both sides.95 The Tribunal's task was extremely limited: it was
to decide the location of fourteen boundary pillars, but it was not authorized to establish a location of a boundary pillar other than at a
location advanced by Israel or by Egypt. 96 "At stake were several
hundred meters of shoreline, corresponding territorial water rights
and a resort hotel complex." 97

2. Issues and Arguments
Israel maintained that the Tribunal should refer to the boundary
defined by the 1906 Agreement because Great Britain, as mandatory
power, and Egypt had explicitly recognized this as the boundary between Egypt and Palestine in declarations in 1926.98 The Tribunal refused, stating that the 1979 Treaty of Peace referred to the
"recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former
mandated territory of Palestine" and not to the 1906 Agreement.99
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, para. 99 (quoting Treaty of Peace,
Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 362 (1979)), reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
1421, 1453 (1988).
91. See id. para. 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1430 (1988).
92. See id. para. 104, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1454 (1988).
93. See id., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1454 (1988).
94. See id. para. 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1430 (1988).
95. See id. para. 4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1431 (1988).
96. See id. paras. 176-77, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1470 (1988).
97. Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 593.
98. See Award in Taba Area Arbitration, supra note 83, para. 143, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1463 (1988).
99. See id. paras. 169-75, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1468-70 (1988).
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The Tribunal thus established the period of the Palestinian Mandate' 1°
as the critical period' 1' and relied on the location of the boundary

pillars as 0they
were understood during this period as the basis for its
2

decision.'
In support of their respective claims, the parties introduced maps,
surveys, and photographs of the area indicating the erection, wear,
removal, or replacement of the pillars at issue.10 3 With regard to the

nine northernmost pillars, situated in an uninhabited desert region in-

volving "apparently no essential interests of the Parties,"" 4 the Tribunal found the arguments of both sides unpersuasive.1 1 5 It therefore
decided in favor of the proposed locations of the pillars that came

closest to establishing a straight line connecting adjacent agreed pillar

locations. °6 The Tribunal thus awarded five of these pillar locations
to Egypt and four to Israel." 7 With regard to the location of four
other pillars, the Tribunal concluded, based on the factual evidence

before it, that the locations advanced by Egypt established the recognized boundary during the critical period."

In reaching its decision regarding the final and most contested pillar
location, the Tribunal relied primarily on photographs introduced by
Egypt indicating the existence of a marker known as the "Parker pillar," which was erected by commissioners implementing the 1906

Agreement 09 The Tribunal rejected Israel's argument that the
Parker pillar was not intervisible with the agreed location of the adjacent pillar to the north, and that this lack of intervisibility contradicted
the 1906 Agreement." 0 The Tribunal relied on evidence that Egypt
and Turkey may have ignored the intervisibility requirement of the

1906 agreement when constructing the pillars in the area of the Parker
pillar."' The Tribunal also rejected Israel's argument that the pillar
100. On July 24, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations approved the Mandate
for Palestine with Great Britain to act as mandatory power. See Wright, supra note 86,
at 201-07. This Mandate entered into force on September 29, 1923 and lasted until

May 14, 1948, when the State of Israel came into existence. See id.

101. The critical period has been defined as the time when the dispute crystallizes
into a concrete issue. See Fox, supra note 7, at 187.
102. See Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, paras. 169-75, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1468-70 (1988).
103. See Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 592-93.
104. Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, para. 182, reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
1421, 1472 (1988).
105. See Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 594.
106. See Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, para. 187, reprintedin 27 I.L.M.
1421, 1473-74 (1988).
107. See Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 594.
108. See Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, paras. 197-213, reprintedin 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1477-83 (1988).
109. See Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 593.
110. See Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, paras. 236-45, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1490-92 (1988).
111. See id., para. 237, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1490-91 (1988).
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had been erroneously erected.' 12 The Tribunal concluded that the
Parker pillar existed at the location advanced by Egypt, and that the
Parties had recognized this pillar as a boundary throughout the critical
period. 13 Thus, Israel could not
at this point challenge its location on
14
the basis of an alleged error.
In its Award, the Tribunal commended the parties for the "spirit of
cooperation and courtesy which permeated the proceedings in general
and which thereby rendered the hearing a constructive experience."" 5
On March 15, 1989, following negotiations and the conclusion of an
agreement, Israel transferred to Egypt sovereignty over the16Taba area
in its entirety, including the resort facilities located there.
3. Preliminary Analysis
Like the Rann of Kutch arbitration, the Taba Area Arbitration successfully resolved a territorial dispute between nations that had a history of violent conflict. The two proceedings attest to the value of
international arbitration as a procedure to demarcate boundaries between states. They also have other important similarities. For example, the dispute to be resolved by the Tribunal in the Taba Area
Arbitration, like that in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration, was well-defined. The Tribunal had limited authority, authorized only to establish
the pillar locations in accordance with one or the other of the party's
claims." 7 Furthermore, the two disputes, although complex, were primarily factual in nature. 118 Thus, after determining the critical period,
the Tribunal relied almost exclusively on testimony and documentary
evidence in rendering its decision as opposed to relying on international legal theories." 9
Unlike the Rann of Kutch, however, the Taba area was economically valuable. The area included a multi-million dollar hotel complex
and accompanying tourist village. 2 ° In addition, after the award was
issued, the Israeli government faced fierce and emotional opposition
to the decision from citizens who worked in Taba.' 2 ' In agreeing to
arbitration, however, the parties had already decided that control of
the Taba was not worth undermining the 1979 peace treaty, which had
112. See id. paras. 214-45, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1483-92 (1988).
113. See id., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1483-92 (1988).
114. See id. paras. 234-35, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1489-90 (1988).
115. Id. para. 14, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1433 (1988).
116. See Ding & Koenig, supra note 82, at 595.
117. See Award in Taba Arbitration, supra note 83, paras. 176-77 reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1421, 1470 (1988).
118. See supra notes 50-71, 98-116 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 50-71, 98-116 and accompanying text.
120. The parties reached an agreement in which Egypt bought the hotel for $37
million and the adjacent village for $1.5 million. See Timothy M. Phelps, IsraelReturns
Sea Resort to Egypt, Newsday, Mar. 16, 1989, at 13.
121. See id.
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officially terminated the thirty-one year old state of war between the
two nations. In other words, "[o]nce the prospect of a meaningful
agreement became real, both parties appreciated that the issue was
strategically meaningless and that under no circumstances could it be
permitted to disrupt the peace relationship that was, by then, seen as
serving their common interests."'' 2
While the Rann of Kutch and the Taba Area arbitrations proved to
be successes, not all international arbitrations have fared as well. Part
I examines the Brcko Area Arbitration, a recent international arbitration that did not succeed in resolving the territorial dispute between the parties.
III.

THE BRCKO AREA ARBITRATION

This part looks at the Brcko Area Arbitration and its surrounding
circumstances. This part also offers explanations as to why the arbi-

tration failed to resolve the dispute between the parties, as the Rann
of Kutch and Taba Area arbitrations were able to do.
A. History of The War in Bosnia
Histories of the war in Bosnia often begin with the secession of the
Republic of Slovenia from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991.11 The true origin of the conflict, however, was
Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in the late 1980s. Milosevic, then
the leader of the Serbian Communists, began gaining political power
and popular support by fomenting nationalist sentiment throughout
Serbia. 124 Amidst Yugoslavia's general political stagnation and economic decline, Milosevic deliberately stoked Serb paranoia and identified other national groups in Yugoslavia as the Serbs' cardinal
enemies.125
In the late 1980s, Milosevic began consolidating his political power

by filling key Politburo positions with his loyalists and by having the
Serbian Assembly abolish the political autonomy of the provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina." Milosevic's political maneuvers and nationalist rhetoric succeeded in convincing the other republics that
Milosevic might institutionalize Serbia's dominance within a federal
122. W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the
Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics, 6 Tul.

J.Int'l & Comp. L. 5, 41 (1998).

123. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to
Ethno-SeparatistClaims, 23 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 63-65 (1998).
124. See id.
125. See hi.

126. See Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History 211-12 (1996) (providing a history

of Bosnia from the second and first centuries B.C. through 1995).
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republic, and persuaded national groups that
they would be vulnera127
ble if left outside their national republic.
Milosevic first signaled his new strategy for creating a Greater Serbia in the Knin region of Croatia, part of the Krajina zone on Bosnia's
north-western border." 8 Serbs constituted a majority in the Krajina
region, and in the summer of 1990 they held a referendum on autonomy for the Serbs, in defiance of the Croatian government, which had
declared the referendum illegal. 129 After the Croatian authorities
tried to confiscate the arms of the local police, the Serb leaders in the
Krajina and the media in Belgrade told the Serbs that the Ustaga were
planning to massacre them.130 When conflicts between the Croatian
police and the Serb militia occurred, the federal government sent in
troops to maintain order over Croatia's objections. 3 '
Despite tension and conflict, Slovene and Croatian leaders spent
much of 1990 trying to convince Milosevic to agree to a peaceful, negotiated transformation from a federal into a confederal state, 32 but
Milosevic refused. 3 3 The final straw for Croatia and Slovenia was
Milosevic's refusal to accept a Croatian, Stipe Mesic, as the next
holder of the automatically rotating federal presidency in May of
1991.111 On June
25, Croatia and Slovenia simultaneously declared
3 5
independence.1
The federal Yugoslav army ("the JNA") attacked Slovenia two days
later. 136 The JNA was met with a well-mounted opposition and, with
a negligible Serb population in Slovenia, the JNA withdrew after ten
days of fighting.' 37 The JNA then turned its attention to Croatia,
which had a substantial Serb minority, and, with the help of the Croatian Serbs, engaged in a full scale conflict with Croatia. 38 The fighting lasted until a United Nations negotiated cease-fire between
Croatia and Serbia went into effect in February 1992, establishing
"U.N. protected" zones around
the territory conquered by the Croa1 39
tian Serb and federal forces.
127. See Orentlicher, supra note 123, at 63-64.
128. See Malcolm, supra note 126, at 215.
129. See id. at 216.
130. See id. The Ustaga was a Croatian extreme nationalist and terrorist movement
led by Ante Pavelic who was installed in power in the Independent State of Croatia,
the German/Italian puppet-state which comprised most of Croatia and Bosnia from
1941-45. See id. at 320-21.
131. See id. at 215-16.
132. In other words, the Croats and Slovenes wanted to transform Yugoslavia from
a state where the federal institutions were primary to one in which the republics
would hold the real authority. See id. at 215.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 225.
135. See id.
136. See Orentlicher, supra note 123, at 64.
137. See id.
138. See Malcolm, supra note 126, at 225-30.
139. See id. at 230.
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While the fighting between Croatia and Serbia continued, the European Community ("EC"), at Germany's insistence, recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states on January 15, 1992.140 One
consequence of this decision was that multi-ethnic Bosnia had little
choice but to seek independence as well. 4 ' Bosnia's only other options were to remain in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia or be divided up
between Serbia and Croatia. 4 2 By this time, however, Serbia's war
aims were already fairly clear. By the fall of 1991, the Bosnian Serb
party, the SDS, led by Radovan Karadzic had already declared four
"Serb Autonomous Regions" in northern and western Bosnia; the federal army had intervened "to protect" the Bosnian Serbs after a series
of minor local incidents and shootings; and, as early as July 1991 there
was evidence that regular secret deliveries of arms to43the Bosnian
Serbs were being arranged by Milosevic and Karadzic.1
Bosnia applied for EC recognition and, following the advice of the
EC's arbitration commission, the Badinter Commission, held a referendum on independence. 44 Approximately sixty-four percent of Bosnia's citizens voted, including many Serbs in the major cities despite
Karadzic's order to boycott the poll. 145 The majority voted in favor of
independence, and the EC officially recognized Bosnia on April 6,
1992.146 On April 6, 1992, in anticipation of recognition, the Bosnian
Serb paramilitary forces attacked the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, instigating a war that lasted three and a half years.1 47 Backed by Serbia,
the Bosnian Serbs seized approximately seventy percent of Bosnia's
territory." During the war, the parties committed "atrocities so
sweeping and barbarous"'149 that the United Nations established the

first war crimes tribunal since the end of World War HII
B.

The Dayton Accords

The war ended in December 1995 as a result of NATO air strikes,
American pressure, and Milosevic's waning support for the Bosnian
140. See id at 229-30.
141. See id at 230. At the time, the ethnic composition of Bosnia was approximately 44% Muslim, 31% Serb, and 17% Croat. See id. at 222-23.
142. See Orentlicher, supra note 123, at 68-69. The President of Bosnia, Alija
Izetbegovic, remarked that choosing between Tudjman (Croatia's president) and
Milosevic "was like having to choose between leukaemia and a brain tumour." Malcolm, supra note 126, at 228.

143. See Malcolm, supra note 126, at 224-28.
144. See iti at 230-31.
145. See id. at 231.
146. See id. at 231-34.
147. See Orentlicher, supra note 123, at 69-70.
148. See id. However, the Bosnian Serbs' control of Bosnia was reduced to just
under 50% by the end of September 1995 after Muslims and Croats joined forces. See
Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Unfinished Peace: Report of the International
Commission on the Balkans 42 (1996).
149. Orentlicher, supra note 123, at 70.

150. See id
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Serbs.'' American-led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio resulted in the
parties' adoption of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Dayton Accords"). 5 ' The Dayton Accords formally ended the war, as well as any hope for a multi-ethnic
Bosnian state. The Bosnian Constitution, included in the Dayton Accords, provides for a single state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, with two
constituent entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the
Federation") and the Republika Srpska ("RS"). 153 The RS, populated
mostly by Bosnian Serbs, occupies forty-nine percent of the territory,
and the Federation, which incorporates the areas with a Muslim and
Croat majority, occupies fifty-one percent. 5 4 In reality, however, the
Federation is split along ethnic lines, with each ethnic group exerting
its own authority in its respective areas.' 55 The structure of the Bosnian government is also ethnically based.156 The Bosnian Constitution, as well as the Federation Constitution, require that a certain
percentage of government offices be reserved for individuals of a certain ethnicity.' 57 Similarly, the presidency consists of three members:
a Bosniac and a Croat elected from Federation territory, and a Serb
elected from the RS. 5 8
In the Dayton Accords, the parties committed themselves to conduct their relations in accordance with the UN Charter, to settle their
disputes by peaceful means, and to the various programs and arrangements set forth in the annexes. 5 9 The annexes address a number of
issues, including the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return
to their pre-war homes, the parties' commitments to observing funda151. See Malcolm, supra note 126, at 258-68. Milosevic stopped supporting the
Bosnian Serbs, at least publicly, in an effort to appease the West and to get economic
sanctions against Serbia lifted. See id. at 258.
152. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and
was witnessed by the Presidents or Prime Ministers of the United States, the Russian
Federation, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and by
the European Union special negotiator. See General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 91 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Accords]. The Dayton Accords
was the West's sixth attempt to arrive at a peace agreement. See Bertrand de Rossanet, War and Peace in the Former Yugoslavia 138 (1997).
153. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is included as Annex 4 to the
Dayton Accords. See Dayton Accords, supra note 152, Annex 4, reprinted in 35 I.L.M.
75, 118-28 (1996).
154. See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't St.,
Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 (1998)
[hereinafter Country Report] (discussing the current state of the Bosnian government), available in <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1997-hrp-reportfbosniahe.html> (visited Apr. 5, 1999).
155. See id.
156. See Ronald C. Slye, The Dayton Peace Agreement: Constitutionalism and
Ethnicity, 21 Yale J. Int'l L. 459, 462-71 (1996) (discussing the potential ramifications
of an ethnically based constitutional system).
157. See id.
158. See id. at 465.
159. See Dayton Accords, supra note 152, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 89-90 (1996).
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mental human rights, and the placement of an Inter Entity Boundary
Line ("IEBL") between the Federation and the RS throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. 160
The most contentious element in the negotiations at Dayton was the
disposition of the Brcko area in northeastern Bosnia. 6 1 Although the
Serbs had been a minority in the area before the war, Serb forces had
taken over the area for strategic reasons to form a corridor connecting
their eastern and western possessions. 62 Large demonstrations by
displaced Croats calling for the return of this territory were held in
Sarajevo and Zagreb.163 Serbs demanded not only that the corridor
remain Serb territory but that it actually be widened. 6" Both sides
threatened to quit negotiating and to resume hostilities if possession
of Brcko was given to the other party. 65 The parties did finally agree
to submit the disputed portion of the IEBL in the Brcko area to binding international arbitration
within one year from the entry into force
66
of the Dayton Accords.'
C. The Brcko Area
The Brcko area consists of the town of Brcko ("the Grad") and the
surrounding municipality ("the Opstina"), situated in a low-lying valley along the Sava River in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina near the
current boundaries of Bosnia, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 67 Historically, the area had been an important economic center."6 According to data from the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Brcko was seventh among Bosnian
towns in income generated from traffic, transportation, and communications.' 6 9 In addition, several large manufacturing enterprises were
located in the area.' Before the war, the area was ethnically mixed.
160. See id. Annexes 1A-11, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 91-149 (1996).

161. See de Rossanet, supra note 152, at 139 (stating, in reference to the Dayton
negotiations, that "the whole effort almost foundered on the disposition of the Brcko
area").

162. See Malcolm, supra note 126, at 268.
163. See id.

164. See id.
165. See Arbitration for the Brcko Area (Rep. Srpska v. Fed. of Bosn. & Herz.)
U.N. Doc. S/1997/126 para. 37, (Arb. Trib. for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in
Brcko Area 1997), reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 409 (1997) [hereinafter Brcko Arbitration Award].
166. See Dayton Accords, supra note 152, Annex 2, art. 5, reprintedin 35 I.LM. 75,

113 (1996). Thus, the Tribunal should have issued its decision by December 14, 1996.
However, at the request of the RS, the parties agreed to extend the date until Febru-

ary 15, 1997. See Brcko Arbitration Avard, supra note 165, para. 6 & n.3, reprintedin
36 I.L.M. 396, 401 (1997).

167. See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, para. 42, reprinted in 36 I.LM.
396, 411 (1997).
168. See id para. 46, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 412 (1997).

169. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 412 (1997).
170. See id, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 412 (1997).
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According to the last census in 1991, the total population of the Grad
was 41,346, of which fifty-six percent were Muslim, twenty percent
were Serbs, seven percent were Croats, and seventeen percent
17 1
designating themselves as belonging to some other ethnic group.
The total population of the Opstina was 87,332, of which forty-four
percent were Muslims, twenty-one
percent Serbs, twenty-five percent
172
Croats, and ten percent other.
During the war between Serbia and Croatia, the Serb paramilitary
troops used Brcko, which housed a JNA barrack, as a training ground
for local Serb volunteers. 73 In April 1992, after the war had spread to
Bosnia, the Serbs attacked Brcko and, in a matter of days, took control of the Grad and an area extending several kilometers south and
west. 174 During the next several months, Serb forces forcibly expelled
virtually the entire population of Muslim and Croat residents. 75 During the first two weeks of May, the Serbs arrested and detained Muslims in camps where up to 5000 inmates were held at any given time
been
during the summer of 1992.176 Up to 3000 prisoners may have
177
killed in the primary camp, known as the Luka Camp, alone.
The Brcko area witnessed some of the fiercest battles of the war,
and while Brcko Grad sustained some damage, numerous towns and
villages surrounding the Grad were totally destroyed. 78 Economic
activity in the area was brought to a virtual standstill.' 79 At the time
the Dayton Accords were signed, the RS controlled approximately
forty-eight percent of the territory of the Brcko Opstina, including
Brcko Grad, and the Federation controlled approximately fifty-two
percent. 180 The entire area represents approximately 464 square
kilometers. 181
D. The Arbitral Tribunal
Annex 2(5) of the Dayton Accords provided for the selection of a
three-member arbitral tribunal, with each party appointing one arbitrator. 18 2 The federation appointed Professor Cazim Sadikovic, while
the RS appointed Dr. Vitomir Popovic. 8 3 The parties' appointees

were supposed to select the third arbitrator to serve as presiding of171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. para. 45, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 411-12 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 411-12 (1997).
id. para. 48, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 412-13 (1997).
id. para. 49, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 413 (1997).
id. para. 50, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 413 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 413 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 413 (1997).
id. para. 51, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 413 (1997).
id. para. 56, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).
id. para. 52, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).
id. para. 2, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 400 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 400 (1997).
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ficer of the tribunal within thirty days after their own selection.1 4' The
appointees failed to agree within the required amount of time, however, so the President of the International Court of Justice appointed
Roberts B. Owen, an American lawyer, as presiding officer of the tribunal in accordance with article V(2) of annex 2 .115 The Parties also
agreed that if a majority decision of the Tribunal was not reached,
then the decision of the presiding arbitrator would be final and binding upon both parties.186 The Arbitral Award justified this decision as
follows:
It may be observed that such an agreement was in fact a virtual

necessity in this particular case: from the outset the positions of the
two parties on the merits have been polar opposites and each party
has explicitly refused to compromise. These polar positions and accompanying intense animosities, consistently in evidence from the
opening of the Dayton conference onward, made clear from the
outset that any party-appointed arbitrator would encounter significant difficulties in conducting himself
with the usual degree of de7
tachment and independence.'
The Arbitral Award also noted the lack of progress made in implementing the provisions of the Dayton Accords relating to the return of
the former residents. Only fifteen Muslim families had thus far returned to Brcko Grad.Ias South of the Grad, where Muslims had attempted to reconstruct homes, twenty-seven homes had been
destroyed by bombings.8 9 In addition, none of the principal enterprises in Brcko had resumed. 90
The preliminary proceedings of the Tribunal were marked by a lack
of cooperation and threats of withdrawal by the RS. Neither Dr. Popovic nor any representative of the RS attended a preliminary conference in Sarajevo in August 1996.191 The RS failed to comment on the
Tribunal's pre-hearing order regarding its adoption of rules of procedure,192 nor did it file pleadings when requested.1 93 Finally, on December 1, 1996, Gojko Klickovic, then President of the RS, wrote a
letter to the Presiding Arbitrator stating that the RS did not intend to
participate in the arbitration proceedings. The letter claimed that the
RS's actions were justified because "'guarantees for a fair and just
procedure do not exist, and... [the Presiding Arbitrator] intend[s] to
use the arbitration process strictly as a smoke screen for the imposi184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See
See
See
Id.,
See
See

id.
para. 3, reprinted in 36 LLM.396, 400 (1997).
id,reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 400 (1997).
id para. 5, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 401 (1997).
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 401 (1997).
id. para. 54, reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).
id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).

190. See id. para. 56, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 414 (1997).

191. See id. para. 8, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 402 (1997).
192. See id. para. 10, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 402 (1997).
193. See id. para. 14, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 404 (1997).
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tion of a pre-ordained, unjust decision, all to the harm of the legitimate and vital interest of Republika Srpska."' 9 4 The letter concluded
by stating that the RS would consider any future Tribunal decisions to
be invalid. 95 Despite the RS's stated withdrawal, however, a delegation from the RS, including Dr. Popovic, did attend the hearings,
which began on January 8, 1997.196
E.

Issues and Arguments

1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The preliminary arguments advanced by the RS concerned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 1 97 First, the RS argued that the Tribunal
had authority only to resolve the final placement of the IEBL in the
Brcko area, as opposed to having the authority to decide whether the
Grad and the Opstina should be included in the territory of the RS or
in the territory of the Federation. 198 The RS further asserted that the
Tribunal had jurisdiction only to move the IEBL to the south of its
present temporary location-in other words, that it only had the authority to enlarge RS territory. 199 Second, the RS contended that it
had never understood at Dayton that a possible outcome of the arbitration might be a transfer of Brcko Grad from RS to Federation territory.2"' The RS then argued that, because it had misunderstood the
facts at Dayton, there had been an error or mistake of fact that invalidated the arbitration agreement under article 48(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.2 0 '
The Tribunal acknowledged that article V of annex 2 did contain
several ambiguities.20 2 Notably, the provision did not explain the nature of the dispute. 20 3 Furthermore, it failed to precisely define the
area in dispute, only making a somewhat vague reference to "the
Brcko area" and the attached maps displayed the IEBL running
through the Opstina. 2°4 Finally, the precise segment of the IEBL that
lay within the disputed area was not explicitly identified either in the
194. Id. para. 21, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 405 (1997).
195. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 405 (1997).
196. See id. para. 26, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 406 (1997).
197. See id. para. 33, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 408 (1997).
198. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 408 (1997).
199. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 408 (1997).
200. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 408 (1997).
201. See id., reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 408 (1997). The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties "sets forth a comprehensive set of rules governing the formation,
interpretation, and termination of treaties ....
Carter & Trimble, supra note 1, at
110. The convention entered into force on January 27, 1980 and over 65 states are
now party to it. See id.
202. See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, para. 36, reprinted in 36 I.L.M.

396, 409 (1997).
203. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 409 (1997).
204. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 409 (1997).
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annex or the attached map."°5 The Tribunal resolved these ambiguities, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, by looking to the ordinary meaning of the language and the
circumstances surrounding the treaty's adoption. 2°6 The Tribunal decided that the ordinary meaning of article V(1), read in context and in
light of the object and purpose of the article, showed that a dispute
existed between the RS and the Federation as to their respective
claims for control of the Brcko area and that the parties agreed to
resolve this dispute by arbitration. 207 The Tribunal also determined
that the lack of precise definitions in the article was due to the widely
divergent positions of the parties at Dayton and to the fact that negotiations on the issue of Brcko broke down as the conference was coming to an end.Ws The Tribunal decided that the exact scope of the
dispute was to be resolved through arbitration, and that it had the
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute as defined by the parties' disagreement at Dayton 0 9 and the claims they asserted during the arbitral
process. 210 Thus, the Tribunal determined that it had the authority to
first define the dispute and then to resolve it.
2.

Legal Arguments

The Federation's principal legal argument in support of its claim to
the Brcko area was based on the international legal doctrine of nonrecognition.211 The Federation argued that the RS conducted a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Brcko area, that this campaign violated peremptory international norms of non-aggression, human rights
protection, and the laws of war, and that the Tribunal should not reward these acts, but rather reverse their effects by granting the territory to the Federation.212 The Tribunal rejected this argument,
observing that while the doctrine precluded the RS from asserting a
legal right to the territory based on its conquest, it did not automatically follow that the Federation was entitled to control of the territory.21 3 The Tribunal stated that the injured party, to whom the
territory should be restored, was the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the Federation which had not been in existence at the time of
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See
See
See
See
See

id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 409 (1997).
id. para. 34, reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 408
id. para. 36, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 409
id. para. 39, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 410
id. para. 37, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 409

(1997).
(1997).
(1997).
(1997).

210. See id. para. 40, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 410 (1997).

211. See id. paras. 58-61 & n.23, reprinted in 36 I.LM. 396, 415-16 (1997) (noting
that the doctrine of non-recognition provides that an act in violation of a norm having
the character of jus cogens is illegal and therefore null and void).

212. See i., reprinted in 36 LL.M. 396, 415-16 (1997). The Federation emphasized
this point by noting that the population of Muslims in Brcko Grad had been reduced

from its pre-war population of 23,000 to approximately 500 at the time the Dayton
Accords were signed. See id. para. 60 n.20, reprinted in 36 .L.M. 396, 416 (1997).
213. See id. para. 78, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 422 (1997).
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the Serb conquest, and that the Dayton Accords had confirmed Bosnia's sovereignty over the entire area. 14
The Tribunal also rejected the Federation's second legal argument. 15 The Federation, citing the International Court of Justice's
opinion in the Western Saharacase, 16 argued that it should be granted
control of Brcko because of the historical demographic, cultural, and
political ties of the Federation to the Brcko area. 17 The Tribunal
found that due to the demographic diversity of Brcko before the war,
neither party had shown sufficiently dominant connections with the
area to justify an award of exclusive control.2 18
The RS confined its legal arguments to principles allegedly derived
from the Dayton Accords. 219 First, the RS argued that the Dayton
Accords incorporated the principles that Bosnia and Herzegovina
should be divided in a ratio of fifty-one to forty-nine, and that the
IEBL as shown on the Dayton map gives it less than forty-nine percent by a small margin.22 ° The RS thus concluded that the Tribunal
was precluded from making any reduction of the RS's territory.221
The Tribunal responded that the fifty-one to forty-nine parameter appeared solely in the preamble to the Dayton Accords and did not itself create a binding obligation,222 and that the Dayton Accords
specifically
left unresolved the territorial allocation in the Brcko
22 3
area.

3.

Equitable Arguments

Besides its legal contentions, the Federation, noting that the Tribunal had the authority to apply relevant equitable principals, maintained that the equities in this dispute overwhelmingly favored an
award of the Brcko area to the Federation. 2 4 The Federation argued
that permitting the Serbs to maintain control of Brcko, which it had
acquired through "brute force and horrific violence, would reward
them for their reprehensible conduct and would fly in the face of the
most fundamental human values. 22 5 The Federation further argued
that allowing the RS to maintain control was inconsistent with the
principals of the Dayton Accords because the RS had, among other
214.
215.
216.
217.
I.L.M.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 422-23 (1997).
See id. paras. 79-80, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 423 (1997).
Western Sahara 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, paras. 62, 79, reprinted in 36
396, 417, 423 (1997).
See id. para. 79, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 423 (1997).
See id. para, 71, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 419-20 (1997).
See id. para. 81, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 423-24 (1997).
See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 423-24 (1997).
See id. para. 82, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 424 (1997).
See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 424 (1997).
See id. para. 64, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 417 (1997).
Id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 417 (1997).
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violations, obstructed the right of Bosniacs and Croats to return to
their homes. 2 6 Finally, the Federation asserted that Brcko was crucial
to the economic development of the Federation, providing the only
link to important markets and products in Europe. 7
The Tribunal conceded that the Federation had demonstrated a
compelling equitable interest in the Brcko area, -22 but was unwilling
to base its decision on this argument. The Tribunal gave equal weight
to the equitable considerations of the RS, namely, the RS's assertion
that it had vital strategic and economic interests in preserving a connecting corridor between its eastern and western parts. 9 The Tribunal did note, however, that the RS had not only failed to honor the
Dayton Accords but had admitted in a written statement that it would
not honor them in at least two respects. 23 First, according to the
statement, the RS planned to continue obstructing travel on all but
one road,231 and second, former residents of Brcko would be entitled
only to compensation, not to recovery of their property 32 This latter
policy would in effect allow the RS to keep Brcko an ethnically pure
Serb community.2 3
Instead of awarding the Brcko area to either party, the Tribunal
mandated that the Brcko area be placed under international supervision. 3 The Tribunal placed all authority for the running of Brcko in
the hands of the Office of the High Representative ("OHR") under
the leadership of a Deputy High Representative for Breko ("Supervisor").3 5 In March 1997, United States Ambassador Robert W. Farrand was selected to serve as the Supervisor of the Brcko area. 23 6 The
Award granted the right to either party to request further action affecting the Award between the dates of December 1, 1997 and January
15, 1998, and stated that a final decision would be made by March 15,
7 Dr. Popovic, the Serb Arbitrator,
1998I3
and Professor Sadikovic,
the Federation Arbitrator, refused to sign the Avard. 23
226. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 417 (1997).
227. See id.,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 417 (1997).
228. See id.para. 89, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 428-29 (1997).
229. See id para. 90, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 429 (1997).
230. See id para. 84, reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 424-25 (1997).
231. See id.para. 84(1), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 424-25 (1997).
232. See id para. 84(2), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 424-25 (1997).
233. See id., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 424-25 (1997).
234. See idt para. 95, reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 396, 431 (1997).
235. See id para. 104(I)(B), reprinted in 36 LLM.396, 434 (1997).
236. See Arbitration for the Brcko Area (Fed. Bosn. & Hem. v. Rep. Srpska), U.N.
Doc. S/1998/248, para. 6 (Arb. Trib. for Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in
Brcko Area 1998) [hereinafter Supplemental Award], available in <http'J/www.ohr.
int/docu/d980315b.htm> (visited Apr. 5, 1999).
237. See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, para. 104 (I)(A), reprinted in
36 IL.M. 396, 436 (1997).
238. See id para. 105, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 436-37 (1997).
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4. The Supplemental Award
The Federation requested further action from the Tribunal and on
March 15, 1998, the Tribunal issued a Supplemental Award.23 9 This
award acknowledged that, at the hearings, the Federation provided
extensive evidence that throughout 1997 the RS had flagrantly violated the Dayton Accords.2 4u Specifically, the RS had resisted all efforts to achieve freedom of movement, the return of displaced persons
and refugees, and the establishment of a democratic multi-ethnic government.241 The RS's basic argument was its interest in territorial
continuity, its theory being that maintenance of the corridor under the
RS's control was absolutely vital "in order to allow (for example) RS
armed forces to move as necessary throughout the Entity.2'' 42 The
Supplemental Award admits to the veracity of the Federation's evidence.243 Despite this admission and the fact that the Award contemplated a final decision at this point, the Tribunal refused to grant final
control of the Brcko area to either side and deferred a final decision
until early 1999, until
which time Brcko would remain under interna2
tional supervision. 1
The Tribunal based this decision primarily on political developments within the RS.2 45 In July 1997, then President of the RS,
Biljana Plavsic, had separated herself from the hard-line Bosnian Serb
leaders headquartered in Pale, including Karadzic, and set up her own
headquarters in Banja Luka.246 Mrs. Plavsic adopted a more progressive stance and appeared to support implementation of the Dayton
Accords.2 4 7 On January 18, 1998, supporters of Mrs. Plavsic installed

a moderate, Milorad Dodik, as Prime Minister of the RS.248 In his
testimony before the Tribunal, Mr. Dodik agreed that Bosniacs and
Croats should be permitted to return to Brcko, and suggested that
Bosnia should become a multi-ethnic democratic state. 24 9 The Tribunal expressed its belief that by the end of the year, the RS government's position toward the implementation of the Dayton Accords
could change if the moderates survived politically through the RS
election scheduled for September 1998.11 The Tribunal stated that
239. See Supplemental Award, supra note 236.
240. See id. para. 4(a).
241. See id.
242. Id. para. 4(b).
243. See id. para. 7.
244. See id. paras. 13-14.
245. See id. paras. 9-12.
246. See id. para. 9.
247. See id.
248. See id. para. 10.
249. See id. paras. 11-12.
250. See id. para. 12. Despite the Tribunal's hope, Plavsic was defeated in the September elections by Nikola Poplasen, the leader of the Radical party, the RS's most
vehemently nationalist party. Although Dodik remained Prime Minister, Poplasen
refused to cooperate with him and attempted to install Dragan Kalinic, another hard-
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the RS would have to demonstrate clearly its full compliance with the
Dayton Accords at the next round of hearings, or else the Tribunal
would diminish the RS's position in Brcko. Neither Professor
Sadikovic nor Dr. Popovic signed the Supplemental Award.S
5. The Final Award
On March 5, 1999, the Tribunal issued its Final A~vard. 52 The Tribunal stated that the basic issue before it was whether the RS could
show that it had complied with the Supplemental Award and had thus
committed itself to complying with the Dayton Accords. " The Tribunal concluded that the leaders of the RS had failed to comply with
Dayton's and the Tribunal's objectives. 2' Specifically, the Tribunal
found that the RS had not allowed displaced persons and refugees to
return to their pre-war homes, did not help in developing democratic
multi-ethnic institutions, and had refused to cooperate with the international supervisory regime.255 Thus, the Tribunal announced the creation of a new government institution, The Brcko District of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 256 to which each entity will delegate all of its powers
of governance within the pre-war Brcko Opstina. According to the Tribunal, the legal effect of this decision "will be
permanently to suspend all of the legal authority of both entities
within the Opstina and to recreate it as a single administrative
unit.""2 The Tribunal granted the authority to implement the changes
needed to establish the new district to the Supervisor, -- 9 and ordered
the entities to comply with all of his rulings or else risk the possibility
of having the district placed within the exclusive control of the other
liner once close to Karadzic. See Bosnia: Putting It Right, The Economist, Nov. 21.
1998, at 52, 52.
251. See Supplemental Award, supra note 236, para. 1 n.1.
252. See Arbitration for the Brcko Area (Fed. Bosn. & Herz, v. Rep. Srpska) (Arb.
Trib. for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area 1999) [hereinafter Final
Award], available in <http'J/wvw.ohr.int/docu/d990305c.htrn> (visited Apr. 4, 1999).
A few hours before the issuance of the Final Award, the High Representative, Carlos
Westendorp, dismissed the hard-line president of the RS, Nikola Poplasen. See Bosnia's Serbs: Two on the Chin, Economist, Mar. 13, 1999 at 61, 61. The RS's parliament rejected both Poplasen's dismissal and the Final Award. The parliament also
"complained of the 'murder' of a member of Mr. Poplasen's Radical Party who had
attacked American peacekeepers on the day of the decision, and was shot dead." Id.
Also in response to the decision, angry Serbs attacked UN vehicles and threw grenades at the offices of international agencies. See id. In addition, the Prime Minister
of the RS, Milorad Dodik, publicly resigned in protest over the decision although he
continues to perform his duties. See id.
253. See Final Award, supra note 252, para. 4.
254. See id para. 6.
255. See id
256. See id. para. 9.
257. See id
258. Id
259. See id para. 8.
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entity. 6 ° Pending the establishment of the new district, the IEBL will
remain in place, and existing laws will remain in force.2 61 Once the
new district is established, the territory will be held in "condominium"
by both entities simultaneously 262 and will remain under the exclusive
sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 63 The Tribunal will retain
the authority to modify the Final Award in the event of non-compliance until the Supervisor and the High Representative notify the Tribunal that the new district is functioning effectively. 26
G. Analysis
Unlike the Taba and Rann of Kutch arbitrations, the Brcko arbitration has not resolved the territorial dispute between the Federation
and the RS. The lack of cooperation by the parties, particularly the
RS, suggests that the issue is unlikely to be resolved in the near future,
despite the issuance of a Final Award. The primary reason for this
arbitration's failure is the fact that control of Brcko represents a major, ongoing political dispute, with neither side willing to compromise.
In expecting arbitration to solve a major political issue, the negotiators at Dayton overestimated its potential as a procedure for peaceful
settlement of international disputes. Although parties may, as in the
Taba arbitration, make a deliberate decision to subordinate national
issues to an agreed settlement, it is difficult to point to any arbitration
that has resolved vital interests of the first importance. 65 States are
reluctant to submit disputes involving vital interests to adjudication. 66
Submission to third party settlement means that parties give up control over outcomes, and states are unwilling to take the chance that
they may lose, particularly when the dispute involves what they consider important or "vital" national interests. 2 67 Although the warring
parties signed the Dayton Accords, and thus agreed to arbitrate
Brcko's status, they did so under duress.26 8 It was evident from the
outset that the hard-liners would try to undermine the agreements
whenever possible. The inter-entity boundary line may have been
designed to be similar to a boundary between two American states,
but it was clear that the Serbs would not voluntarily accept such a
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. para. 11.
263. See id. para. 9.
264. See id. para. 13
265. See Fox, supra note 7, at 193 (noting that states have rarely submitted issues
concerning their vital interests to arbitration).
266. See id.
267. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, 1 Emory J. Int'l Disp. Resol. 1, 15 (1986) [hereinafter Bilder, Overview] (categorizing disputes by their relative importance to the parties).
268. See Richard Holbrooke, Letters to the Editor: Richard Holbrooke on Bosnia,
Foreign Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 170, 170 (attempting to refute the suggestion that
he had favored the partition of Bosnia).
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concept. "As expected, [the Serbs] are trying to turn the inter-entity
boundary line into a partition line."2 6 9 Thus, the Brcko arbitration has
become a complex extension of the conflict.
The second factor that distinguishes the Brcko arbitration from the
Taba and Rann of Kutch arbitrations is that the precise issue the Tribunal was to decide was never clearly defined. The definition of the
issue is legally important, in that it confers jurisdiction on the arbitrators.2 7 For example, in the Rann of Kutch arbitration, the Tribunal's
authority was limited by agreement of the parties to awarding the disputed territory to either India or Pakistan in light of the parties' respective legal claims.27 ' Thus, the Tribunal had no authority to award
the territory to a third party or to decide the issue, ex aequo et bono,
outside the bounds of the law.2 72 In addition, in the Taba Arbitration,
the parties severely limited the Tribunal's authority, in that it could
only choose between the locations of the boundary pillars advanced
by either side and could not independently determine the pillars'
locations.2 7 3
In contrast, the Dayton Accords did not clearly define either the
issue to be decided or the area in dispute. It was not clear at the
outset of the proceedings whether the Tribunal was to determine
which party would be granted final control of "the Brcko Area," or
whether it was to determine the final location of the IEBL, and thus
possibly divide the territory between the two entities. 274 Therefore,
the authority of the Tribunal was also unclear. For example, it is not
clear whether the Dayton Accords grant the Tribunal either the right
to radically alter Bosnia's current territorial distribution or the power
to form a new government. Nor is it clear whether the Tribunal has to
base its final decision on the legal and equitable claims of the parties
or whether it legitimately has the authority to decide the issue ex aequo et bono. In fact, it is unclear whether there are any limitations on
the Tribunal's authority. The Dayton Accords do not expressly grant
the Tribunal the authority to place Brcko under international supervision or to create a new government. It is well established that arbitrators may not decide issues that have not been referred to their
arbitration.2 7 5 It is quite possible, therefore, that the parties could legally challenge the Award as a nullity on the ground that the Tribunal
has exceeded its jurisdiction.27 6
269. Id. at 171.
270. See Fox, supra note 7, at 171.
271. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
272. See Rann of Kutch Award, supra note 50, at 642-43.
273. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
275. See Fox, supra note 7, at 171.
276. See id. Practically speaking, however, it is doubtful that either side has the
resources to effectively challenge the Tribunal's authority.
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Additionally, the ambiguity concerning the issue actually before the
Tribunal may have undermined any confidence that the parties might
have had in the Tribunal's willingness to render a fair, unbiased decision. For example, although the parties might have expected that the
Tribunal would award the Brcko area to one of them in its initial
award, the Tribunal bestowed upon itself the authority to establish an
international supervisory regime and granted that regime the power,
not only to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Accords, but
also to oversee the administration of the entire area. Under this authority, the Supervisor selected judges and designed Brcko's judicial
2 77 It is unclear whether either party exand administrative systems.
278
result.
a
pected such
Another distinguishing feature of the Brcko Arbitration is that it
involved complex legal issues, unlike the Rann of Kutch and Taba
Area arbitrations, which were primarily factual disputes. The Tribunal had to decide which of two newly created entities should be
awarded territory within a newly independent state. The Tribunal was
thus not able to rely on documentary evidence in rendering its Award,
as were the two previous Tribunals. The Tribunal refused, however, to
rely upon and possibly expand relevant principles of international law.
For instance, the Tribunal rejected the Federation's principal argument that the doctrine of non-recognition supported its claim to the
territory.279 The Tribunal rigidly applied the doctrine and concluded
that the territory, although forcibly acquired by the Serbs, remained
part of Bosnia Herzegovina, the original territorial sovereign, to
whom the territory would be returned if the doctrine were applied.280
In so concluding, the Tribunal refused to acknowledge that a traditional application of the doctrine might not be appropriate in this
case.
Although Bosnia is technically one state, it has been effectively partitioned into two separate entities, with each entity maintaining control of its own territory.281 Furthermore, although the Serbs did not
forcibly wrest territory from the Federation, they did take control of
the territory in violation of the United Nations Charter and general
principles of international law. The majority of the Brcko area is currently located in the RS and, although Brcko is under international
supervision, the RS exerts a significant amount of influence over the
area. If, as the Tribunal stated, the theory behind the doctrine of non277. See Office of the High Representative, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Essential
Texts, 214-15, 223 (1998).
278. By the time the Tribunal issued the Final Award, however, the parties most
likely realized that the odds were against the Tribunal awarding the territory to either
side.
279. See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, paras. 77-78, reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 396, 422 (1997).
280. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
281. See Country Report, supra note 154.
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recognition is that acts contrary to international law should not become a source of legal rights for a wrongdoer s this theory has been
defeated by the Tribunal's decision.
The Tribunal was also at times inconsistent in its emphasis. For the
purposes of the Federation's non-recognition argument, it treated the
parties as belonging to one state and emphasized the Dayton Accords'
affirmation of the territorial sovereignty of Bosnia Herzegovina.' s
When discussing the equitable arguments of the parties, however, the
Tribunal acknowledged the economic and strategic value of the Brcko
area to both sides.' s Nevertheless, the Tribunal admitted that the integration of the entities, according to the principles of the Dayton Accords would render superfluous "some or all" of the economic and
strategic necessity of controlling the area.'8
The Tribunal did, at times, seem to side with the Federation. At one
point in its initial Award, the Tribunal alluded to the possibility of
awarding the Federation all the major commercial roads through the
corridor and the Brcko Grad itself.8 This statement, however, seems
to have been more of a threat to the RS than an actual consideration.
Throughout all three of the Awards, the Tribunal emphasized the need
for both Parties to implement the Dayton Accords. And, although it
criticized both sides for their failures, the Tribunal was particularly
critical of the RS. The Tribunal cited the RS's refusal to allow refugees to return to their homes and accused it of attempting to keep
Brcko an "ethnically pure" Serb community.' s Despite this, however, and in spite of its acknowledgment of the Federation's equitable
arguments, the Tribunal delayed issuing a final award because of the
very real possibility that any final resolution of the dispute would reignite the conflict. The delay in rendering a final decision froze the
status quo, which undoubtedly worked to the advantage of the RS,
since it controlled much of the Brcko Area, including Brcko Grad. 288
This provided little incentive for the RS to cooperate with the Tribunal. Indeed, the RS did not cooperate and the Tribunal, faced with
the need to issue a final award, devised a political solution devoid of
any reference to the parties respective arguments. 8 9
282. See Brcko Arbitration Award, supra note 165, para. 77, reprintedin 36 .L.M.

396, 422 (1997) (citing 1 Oppenheim's International Law 183-84 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts, eds. 1992)).
283. See id. para. 78, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 422-23 (1997).
284. See id. paras. 89-92, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 428-30 (1997).
285. See id. para. 90, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 429 (1997).
286. See id. para. 86, reprinted in 36 LL.M. 396, 426 (1997).
287. See id. para. 84(2), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 396, 425 (1997); Supplemental

Award, supra note 236, paras. 4(a), 7.
288. See Richard B. Bilder, JudicialProceduresRelating to the Use of Force, 31 Va.
J. Int'l L. 249, 269 (1991) [hereinafter Bilder, Use of Force] (stating that where a state
uses force to occupy territory, it may refer the matter to adjudication in the hope that
this will work to its advantage by freezing the status quo).
289. See Fimal Award, supra note 252, passim.
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Given the highly political nature of this conflict and the refusal of
the parties to cooperate, the Tribunal had little choice but to delay its
final decision and, ultimately, to develop a political solution. 290 A final decision that awarded the territory to either side could easily have
exacerbated already high tensions. To avoid this result, or to at least
forestall it, the Tribunal openly based its decisions on purely political
considerations. 291 Indeed, a final decision was delayed for a second
time to see what would happen in the upcoming RS elections.29 2 That
the Tribunal would rely on political considerations was to be expected,
given the parties' open hostilities and divergent views as early on as
the negotiations at Dayton.293 The problem with this politicization of
the arbitral process is that legal and equitable arguments become secondary to political concerns. In this context, the arbitral forum is no
longer a judicial body formed by the parties for the purpose of peacefully resolving a legal or factual dispute. Instead, it is reduced to a
political spectacle imposed on the parties, and it remains unable to
reduce the tensions between the parties, let alone resolve the dispute.
Although the incorporation of an arbitration agreement did permit
the conclusion of the Dayton Accords, the hasty inclusion of the
Brcko arbitration agreement may have unfortunate repercussions. It
is difficult to say at this time what effect such a distortion of the arbitral process will have on future territorial disputes. Most likely, the
Brcko Arbitration will not strengthen or encourage the greater use of
such dispute mechanisms. Future parties in a similar dispute may very
well refer to the Brcko Arbitration as a reason not to submit their
dispute to international arbitration, out of fear that an international
tribunal will have the authority to decide important issues based on its
own political considerations and, in effect, disregard the legal and equitable arguments of the parties.
As the preceding discussion has shown, although arbitration can be
used successfully to resolve territorial disputes, it is not always the
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism. Other mechanisms do exist, however, and may prove more appropriate to a given situation.
Part IV examines these approaches and explains what negotiators
should consider when deciding if the use of arbitration is proper.

IV.

THE USE OF OTHER DisPuTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
APPROPRIATE IN SETTLING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

The most common and accepted methods used to settle international disputes peacefully are those set forth in article 33 of the United
Nations Charter. These methods range from diplomatic means to
290.
291.
292.
293.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.; Supplemental Award, supra note 236, paras. 9-12.
Supplemental Award, supra note 236, para. 17.
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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legal means, and include negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and resort to the United Nations' or other international organization's dispute settlement procedures.29 4 The primary difference
between diplomatic and legal means is the extent of third party involvement in the dispute resolution. 295 Diplomatic means of dispute
resolution leave control of the outcome primarily to the parties themselves, while legal means grant a third party or parties more control in
determining a settlement.2 96 These various methods are not, however,
mutually exclusive. A combination of legal and diplomatic means will
often be used either seriatim or in combination to settle a given dispute. 297 This part discusses the three methods most significant for the
purpose of this analysis, explaining the circumstances in which each
may be most appropriate in resolving a territorial dispute. This part
then examines the appropriateness of their use in the cases that have
been examined in this Note.
A.

The Three Methods
1. Negotiations

Diplomatic negotiation between the parties concerned is often considered the most efficient method of settling international disputes29
and is "clearly the predominant, usual and preferred method. ''12" Indeed, negotiation is used more frequently than all other dispute resolution methods combinedA° Parties usually prefer negotiation to
other methods for a variety of reasons: negotiation allows the parties
to maintain maximum control over the outcome; a negotiated settlement is more likely to be accepted by the parties;
and negotiation is
30
simpler and less costly than other methods. '
Although negotiation is the method most likely to be combined
with other dispute resolution techniques, bilateral negotiations alone
have been sufficient to resolve territorial disputes in a number of
cases. 30 2 More often, however, parties to a dispute hold such diver294. U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. For an analysis of the dispute resolution techniques not discussed here, see Merrills, supra note 13, at 285-88.
295. See Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 Deny.
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 471, 480-81 (1989) [hereinafter Bilder, Third Party] (discussing the
usefulness and success of third party intervention in international disputes).

296. See id.
297. See id

298. See Sohn, supra note 13, at 1122.
299. Bilder, Overview, supra note 267, at 22.
300. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 2.
301. For a more complete list of the pros and cons of negotiation, see Bilder, Overview, supra note 299, at 22 & n.36.
302. See Evan Luard, FrontierDisputes in Modern InternationalRelations, in The

International Regulation of Frontier Disputes, supra note 7, at 7, 24 [hereinafter
Luard, FrontierDisputes] (briefly discussing the use

of negotiation to solve territorial

disputes between, for example, China and several of its neighbors and between the
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gent views that they are unable or unwilling to compromise, making
negotiations impossible. This failure to compromise is due in large
part to the fact that "territory has a psychological importance for nations that is quite out of proportion to its intrinsic value, strategic or
economic."33 Ideas of national pride and honor may exacerbate the
issue and make even the appearance of compromise too contentious
to permit effective negotiation. Thus, third party involvement becomes critical to reconciling the views of the two states if a solution is
to be reached.30 4
2. Mediation
Parties to a dispute often agree to mediation 30 5 when bilateral negotiations break down or cannot be initiated, and the parties desire limited third party intervention.3 °6 The function of the mediator, often a
third state or an international organization, is to bring the parties together and facilitate their negotiations. 3 7 The mediator may also offer specific suggestions for settlement.30 8 States may be more willing
to request or consent to mediation, as opposed to other third party
dispute resolution mechanisms such as adjudication, primarily because
any decision reached is not legally binding.30 9 Thus, as with bilateral
negotiations, states have no obligation to reach a settlement or to implement one. Mediation also has the advantage of flexibility in that
the mediator is not bound by legal considerations. 310 The mediator is
free to assess the interests of both sides and devise whatever compromise it deems appropriate.311 In addition, mediation allows the participating parties to interpret the process in "face saving" ways for the
benefit of public opinion 312 and encourages parties to find politically
United States and Mexico); Merrills, supra note 13, at 1-26 (discussing negotiation,

including examples of its successes and failures, in resolving international disputes in
general).
303. Luard, FrontierDisputes, supra note 302, at 7.
304. See Evan Luard, Conclusions,in The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes, supra note 7, at 221, 225 [hereinafter Luard, Conclusions].

305. Mediation and good offices are often put in the same category in discussions of
third party international dispute resolution. In the case of good offices, the role of the

third party is usually limited to bringing the parties together and facilitating their
negotiations. See Bilder, Overview, supra note 267, at 24. With mediation, however,
the third party usually plays a somewhat more active role and is sometimes allowed to
advance proposals for resolution of the dispute. See id. In practice, however, such
distinctions are often blurred, and a third party that offers its assistance in the form of
good offices will, in essence, serve as mediator. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 27.
306. See Naomi Schwiesow, Mediation, in The International Regulation of Frontier
Disputes, supra note 7, at 141, 141.
307. See Bilder, Overview, supra note 267, at 24.

308. See id.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See
See
See
See

Schwiesow, supra note 306, at 142.
Luard, Conclusions, supra note 304, at 228.
id.
Schwiesow, supra note 306, at 142.
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acceptable solutions, which may prove to be more lasting than arbitral
or judicial decisions."' 3
Mediation has been most effective at forestalling or ending hostilities, but it has often fallen short of reaching a fundamental resolution
for political and territorial questions involved in border disputes. 4
This is due, at least in part, to the fact that states involved in territorial
disputes will usually only agree to some form of negotiation when the
conflict has developed to such a point that negotiation is advantageous to both sides. 315 For example, if hostilities have occurred, but
prolonging them has become too difficult or costly, some form of negotiation is more likely. States are unlikely to agree to any form of
negotiation if they believe they can gain their objectives through force
at an acceptable cost.3 16 Thus, mediation rarely occurs except when
such conflicts have been "exacerbated nearly to, or beyond, the point
of military engagement."31 7 Therefore, mediation may be most effective where the main objective is not to resolve the underlying dispute
318
but to pacify the parties and to avoid or to put an end to hostilities.
Once the parties have stopped fighting, they may be able to agree on
an appropriate forum for the resolution of the underlying dispute.319
3.

Judicial Settlement

Judicial settlement involves the reference of the dispute, by the consent of the parties, to a permanent judicial body, such as the International Court of Justice.32

°

Judicial settlement and arbitration are often

grouped together in discussions of third party dispute resolution
mechanisms, because both usually apply international law as the basis
for adjudication. They are therefore distinguishable from mediation
and negotiation, in which the political aspects of a dispute often determine the outcome.32 ' In addition, adjudication usually leads to final
313. See id.
314. For example, in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kash-

mir in 1965, the mediation of the Soviet Union was instrumental in securing a ceasefire between the two warring nations. No progress was made, however, in resolving
the underlying dispute. See Merrills, supra note 13, at 29, 40-41.
315. See Schwiesow, supra note 306, at 163-64.

316. See id. Thus, the effectiveness of mediation, as with any form of negotiation,
will be limited by the parties' willingness or ability to compromise. The fact that disputing parties have agreed to third party involvement, however, may, in and of itself,

suggest that they are ready to make concessions. See id.
317. Id. at 165.
318. See Luard, Conclusions, supra note 304, at 228.
319. For example, the United Kingdom served as mediator between India and Pakistan after hostilities erupted over the Rann of Kutch. Although the mediation did not
resolve the issue, the two sides did agree to a cease-fire and to submit the dispute to

arbitration. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
320. See Bilder, Overview, supra note 267, at 25.
321. See Henry Darwin, Judicial Settlement, in The International Regulation of
Frontier Disputes, supra note 7, at 198, 198.
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and legally binding decisions.32 2 The advantages and disadvantages of
referring a dispute to a permanent court are similar to those of arbitration. 32 3 Among the potential advantages of adjudication is that it is
dispositive, and thus, ideally, should put an end to the dispute. 32 4 As
there is often a long delay before disputes are adjudicated, adjudication may also help to "'de-politicize' a dispute [by] reducing tensions
or buying time."3 25 Adjudication also allows the parties to blame the
tribunal for any unfavorable outcome, which may be an important
"face saving" technique.32 6 In addition, since adjudicated decisions
are based on neutral principles of law and equity rather than power or
bias, adjudicated decisions may be preferable to negotiated settlements, especially to a state in a weaker bargaining position. 2 7
There are, however, a number of disadvantages to adjudication. For
example, adjudication may decide the legal issues at stake but fail to
address the underlying political problems. 8 The absence of political
solutions may render any outcome untenable. In addition, adjudication does not foster compromise since only one side will win, and any
decision reached is imposed on the parties. 32 9 The ability of two disputing states to compromise is often crucial to the implementation of
a decision and, perhaps more importantly, to future peaceful relations.
Furthermore, any adversarial proceeding may serve to exacerbate the
dispute.3 3 °
States have rarely agreed to submit territorial disputes to a permanent court for adjudication. 3 The primary reason for this reluctance
is that states often view territory, or their claim to that territory, as a
matter of vital national concern and are unwilling to risk losing that
territory or their claim to it.332 Thus, states may be more willing to
agree to refer their disputes to a permanent court-if the territory in322. See Bilder, Third Party, supra note 295, at 481-82. The parties may agree to an
advisory opinion, however, if the court's rules so allow. Arbitral tribunals may also
issue advisory opinions with the parties' consent. See id.
323. See generally id. at 483-86 (providing a more comprehensive list of the advantages and disadvantages of adjudicated settlements of international disputes).
324. See id. at 488-90.
325. Id. at 489.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 490.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See Darwin, supra note 321, at 201. Although infrequent, states have occasionally agreed to have their territorial disputes decided by permanent courts such as
the I.C.J. For example, in the FrontierDispute case, Burkina Faso and Mali asked the
I.C.J. to resolve a boundary dispute that less than ten years before had caused a war
between them. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). For
an historical and factual analysis of this dispute see Border and Territorial Disputes,
supra note 86, at 105-10. For an analysis that focuses on the I.C.J.'s participation in
the dispute see Merrills, supra note 13, at 129-30, 151, 153, 161.
332. See Darwin, supra note 321, at 218.
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volved is small and/or not particularly valuable. As discussed above,
states have more often consented to arbitration because it provides
many of the benefits of a permanent court but is a more flexible procedure.333 As with arbitration, however, parties are more apt to agree
to judicial settlement in relatively apolitical disputes where they can
agree on the nature of the dispute and the appropriate means to resolve it. Where the dispute is more contentious, however, a state may
still prefer a judicial settlement to the prospect of going to war.3z
Furthermore, if a state believes it has a superior legal claim, it may
prefer to be heard publicly by a permanent court in the hope that the
strength of its arguments and commitment to peaceful settlement may
strengthen domestic and international support for its cause.3 35
B.

The Appropriateness of Arbitration in the Instances
Previously Discussed

At times, each of the above methods has been effective in resolving
territorial disputes. No single method, however, is appropriate for
resolving every territorial dispute. To be effective, the third party or
parties recommending a technique for resolution must first understand the nature of the dispute, the value of the territory at issue
(whether strategic, economic, or symbolic), and the parties' willingness to compromise. Most importantly, third parties must understand
that, to be effective, all of these dispute resolution techniques require
a commitment to peaceful resolution by the parties involved in the
dispute.
Arbitration has proved most productive in relatively apolitical disputes where the parties' claims to the land are based on historical arguments and documentary evidence. The Rann of Kutch and the Taba
Area arbitrations provide examples of such situations. The disputes in
theses arbitrations were either not highly sensitive or the parties had
previously decided to subordinate their interests in the territory to
more profound national concerns.3 3 6 The parties in both disputes

were, therefore, willing to cooperate and participate in the resolution
of their respective disputes within the arbitral forum. 337 None of these
factors, however, were present in the Brcko arbitration. It is therefore
not surprising that the Tribunal refused to award the territory to either
party. Additionally, the Brcko Arbitration involved a highly political
conflict that involved complex legal issues which further contributed
to its failure.338 This is not to say that arbitration could never be used
effectively to resolve more contentious claims to territory, but coerc333. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.

334. See Bilder, Use of Force, supra note 288, at 268.
335. See id.
336. See supra notes 78-81, 122 and accompanying text.

337. See supra notes 46-49, 115-16 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
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ing parties into arbitrating novel legal issues in highly political situations has proved ill-advised. Thus, to strengthen arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism, negotiators should first evaluate the
nature of the dispute and then, if appropriate, secure a meaningful
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration. The parties can then
work together to determine the precise issue to be adjudicated and the
limits on the tribunal's authority. The negotiators at Dayton failed to
take these steps and, as a result, the Brcko arbitration will most likely
deter future parties from using arbitration as a means to settle territorial disputes.
CONCLUSION

In view of the danger and cost that the use of force poses for all in
the international community, it is important to develop every conceivable peaceful means of resolving international conflicts. Increasingly,
international conflicts involve complex issues of territorial control
based on ethnicity. The inclusion in peace treaties of such dispute resolution mechanisms as arbitral clauses may be one way to peacefully
solve such disputes. Such clauses may not only provide a peaceful
means of settlement, but may also allow negotiators to defer a final
decision on a politically sensitive issue until the parties have had time
to cool off and the issue is no longer in the public eye. Resort to
adjudication, however, is not appropriate in every situation, as evidenced by the Brcko Area dispute. Because states are usually reluctant to turn to adjudication for the settlement of disputes involving
their vital interests, there is little precedent for the use of arbitral
tribunals to resolve disputes resulting from recent, large-scale, armed
conflicts. The use of other dispute resolution mechanisms may, therefore, be more appropriate in these situations.

